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I
i IN THE SUPREME COURT
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I
I

I
I

[
I

DESERET ARCHITECTS AND \
EXGINEERS and NORTH,IVESTERN NAT ION AL INSURANCE
COMP ANY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISS10 N OF UTAH, MURREL
HOCKENBURY, JR., TERMIXEX, INC., and THE STATE
IXSURANCE FUND,

Case No.
11139

Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves a controversy between two in>urance carriers. The question presented is who is liable
ior \rorkmen's Compensation to the claimant, Murrel
Hockenbury, Jr. It is not disputed that on or about
1
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January 16, 1967, that Mr. Hockenbury suffered an
injury which occurred during the course and scope of
his employment. The defendant, The State Insurance
Fund, was on this date the insurance carrier for Terminex, Inc. The plaintiff, Northwestern N ationa] Jn.
surance Company, was the insurance carrier for Deseret
Architects and Engineers.
A heari11g was had in this matter on April 24, 1967,
whereby the facts set forth above were agreed to by
the parties. ( R. 20 & 21)
Prior to the fall of 1966, the applicant was employed by Terminex, Inc. as a salesman in regard to
pest control services. Mr. Hockenbury's duties for Ter·
minex were to sell the services of this employer based
upon "leads" received by personal contact, telephone
and advertisements. ( R. 22) During the period of time
that the applicant was performing these duties, he was
furnished a company truck by Terminex. ( R. 23) The
applicant would report to the office in the morning and
obtain the company truck prior to commencing work.
(R. 24) The truck carried an identification entitled
"Terminex of Utah." (R. 24) Also, a company um·
form was issued to him in the form of a white smock
which had a designation on the back for "Pest-Control
Service." ( R. 25) The applicant received compensa·
tion based upon a guaranteed wage of $3.10 per hour
for 40 hours per week plus a commission in regard to
his sales so that he earned approximately $850.00 per
. \\11
month. ( R. 26) On some occasions he use d his 0

2
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rchide in selling the services of Terminex for which
he \\'Crnld receive no reimbursement. (R. 26) The defe11dant Terminex, Inc. is a corporation of which the
Jpplicant owns a substantial percentage of the outstanding stock. The claimant had, on prior occasions, that is,
in I9G2 and 1964, done suney work for a short period
of time. ( R. 47 & 48)
The plaintiff in its brief seems to indicate that in
the month of October, 1966, when Hockenbury changed
his duties, he was essentially perfarming the same functions that he had done prior to the time that he left Terminex, Inc. The record is clear, however, that the duties
!hat he was assigned to in the fall of 1966 varied in great
detail. \Vhen asked on examination the following queslion the claimant answered as fallows:
"Q. Now, directing your attention to this
October or November time, did your duties
change in any manner?
"A.

Extremely." (R. 27, 28)

It appears from the record that Mr. Hockenbury's direct supervisor, Mr. Nelson, was contacted by an officer
of the plaintiff, concerning the borrowing of employees
lrom 'l'erminex. Mr. Christensen, a representative of
Deseret Architects and Engineers, testified as follows:

"In this conversation with Mr. Nelson, Mr.
Hockenbury and Mr. Schmidt were made available to us, on the basis that we would take them
nt the time that they were not needed at Terminex, that we would ·reimburse Terminex of Utah

3
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T
their standard hourly rate, plus 20% for payroll
tax deduction and office overhead, and this type
of expenditures relevant to payroll." (R. 70)
As mentioned earlier, at this time .Mr. Hocken.
bury's duties varied in great detail. He returned h~
uniform to Terminex and entered into a new arrange·
ment in regard to compensation. \Vhen working for
Deseret Architects and Engineers he was paid a salary
based on an hourly basis plus time and a half for over.
time over a forty hour week. Obviously, he received no
compensation based upon commissions because he 11al
selling no particular service or product at the time he
was employed by Deseret. He was compensated for
the use of his own automobile at IOc a mile by Deseret.
On reporting to the off ice of Deseret Architects
and Engineers he was given a list of places to survey.
He would determine by personal inspection if the buildings had basements and, if so, whether they would be
a proper fallout shelter ( R. 32) . After he made contact
with the addresses furnished him he would examine tl1e
blueprints of the building in order to determine whether
or not they would be appropriate for fallout shelter)
and if he could not obtain these blueprints, he would
measure the sides of the building and draw a diagram
of the building ( R. 33) . The forms used and all direc·
tions were given by Deseret. When he finished a list
of particular areas he would go back to Deseret and
report to them and receive another list.
It is clear that once the claimant commenced t~
work for Deseret then in no manner did Tcrminex dired
1
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1

him in the performance of any of his duties. The unl'll!ltested testimony came from the applicant himself
11 hen he lestif ied as follows:
"Q. Did Mr. Nelson tell you what to do on
this job?

"A.

No.

"(-l.

Did he tell you how to do it?

"A.

No.

''(~. Did he ever delineate any duties you had
to do subsequent - meaning afterwards, after
this <late - for Deseret Architects?

No.

"A.

"(~. Did anyone at Terminex, Inc. ever recommend or tell you what to do in regards to the
time you were connected with Deseret Architects?

"A.

No."

Also at Record 38 the applicant testified as fallows:

"Q. '\Then you were performing this survey
work, were you at any time instructed what to do
by any representative of Terminex, Inc?

"A.

No, sir.

"Q. Did they in any manner tell you what
your duties would be, when you were conducting
this survey?

"A.

They did not.

"Q. Now you feel that your employer, during this period of time, was the Deseret Architects?

* * *

j
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"A. \\r ~11, I will answer this way, I reported
to ~r. Christensen on the mornings when I we t
to his office to do the survey work."
n
The applicant testified (R. 47) as follows:
. "Q.

~as there a~1y individual at Terminex

vorp~ra~10n

super10r!

you considered to be your immediaL

"A. Not while I was working with Deseret."
The record is clear, therefore, that once the applicant left the services of Terminex that they nor their
officers in no manner attempted or did control the appli·
cant's actions.
The applicant after reporting for work for the
plaintiff Deseret Architects and Engineers was instructed how to prepare the forms which were necessary
in compiling the data in question (R. 43). All instruc·
tions were given by a representative of Deseret. Also,
a camera was furnished to the applicant for the taking
of the pictures of the buildings in question (R. 43).
Once the claimant completed a particular project he re·
turned his work to Deseret and received other locations.
He was furnished a manual which set forth the basic
instructions in the compilation of the material in ques·
tion.
He reported daily to the off ice of Deseret Archi·
tects and either talked to Mr. Christensen or his secre·
tary as to a building that wasn't on the survey or which
he thought ought to be examined.

6
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The plaintiff's brief both in the Statement of Fads
and Argument emphasizes the fact that the defendant
Hockenbury reported his injury to Terminex, Inc.
rather than to Deseret Architects and Engineers. The
implication that the plaintiff draws from this fact is
that the claimant himself considered himself an employee of Terminex rather than Deseret Architects.
' The tesimony cited above negates this implication or
inference. The Hearing Examiner, however, in this
case made inquiry of the applicant as to his reason for
reporting his accident to Terminex and he testified at
R. 55 as follows :
"Q. And you reported the injury to Terminex. 'Vhy didn't you report it to Deseret Architects? 'Vas it more convenient for you, or what?

"A. 'Vell, I decided after I had fallen that it
would take me five minutes to get up, and it was
about the time I went home, and that it is on the
way home. So I would have them contact them
that I had fallen."

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF AN
E:\IPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTl\G BE T\VEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND
THE DEFENDANT HOCKENBURY IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

7
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It is fundamental and this Court has on many occa.
sions stated that when one appeals from an order of
the Industrial Commission the issue presented is not
whether or not the Supreme Court would have inter- '
preted the facts differently, rather, the question presented is whether or not the Commission's ruling is basea
upon competent evidence. It is submitted that in this
case the order of the Industrial Commission cannot oe
said to be arbitrary and capricious. The order on file
herein (R. 116, 117, 118) lists 14 findings of factwhico
sustain their award in this case that the applicant ~for.
rel Hockenbury, Jr. was an employee of Deseret Archi·
tects and Engineers at the time of the accident, and as
such, its carrier, Northwestern National Insurance
Group, is liable for compensation.

1

j

The plaintiffs in this case are asserting the same argu·
ment that they made to the Industrial Commission in the
form of memoranda and other motions. On appeal they
do not attack the findings as such but argue as to
the proper interpretation to put on the evidence ad·
duced at the hearing before the Industrial Commission.
In a recent case, Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 19
Utah 2d 367, 431 P. 2d 794, the court set forth the bur·
den that the appellant has in cases involving rulings o!:
the Industrial Commission and spoke to the question °1
credibility and the effect of evidence as follows:

"Under our statutes and long established deci·
sional law there are insuperable obstacles to ~e
O'l'anting of the relief sought bv plaintiffs on t 15 •
~.
ff'
tiye)f
appeal: it was their burden to show a 1rma ·

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and to so persuade the Commission that Mr.
c;.arner's death resulted from a disease caused by
his occupation. lt is the prerogative of the Commissiua, and not of any individual witness, or
en.:11 of the medical panel, to judge the credibility
of the evidence, and upon the basis of the whole
evidence to determine the facts. The plaintiffs
haYing failed to so persuade the Commission, it
is the duty of this court to survey the evidence
in ihe light most favorable to the findings aud
order; and we cannot reverse and compel an
award unless there is credible evidence without
substantial contradiction which points so clea~rly
and persuasively in plaintiffs' favor that failure
to so find must be regarded as capricious and
arbitrary. Conversely, if there is any reasonable
basis in the evidence, or from the lack of evidence,
which will justify the refusal to so find, we must
affirm."
See also Kent v. Industrial Co1nmission, 89 Utah
381, 57 P. 2d 724; Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commis-

Utah 17 4, 246 Pac. 698; Vause v. Industrial
Commission, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P. 2d 1006.

xio11, 67

In the plaintiffs argument under Point I they reargue the inferences that should be drawn, they claim,
from the evidence and state, without citing any specific
authority, that there was not an implied contract between
the plaintiff and Mr. Hockenbury. They have cited as
being "axiomatic" that one becomes an employer or an
tniployee only on the basis of a contract, express or implied, and cite American Jurisprudence and Corpus
s . .Juris Secundum. These general authorities set forth
the proper rule to be considered in cases of this kind.

9
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•

i

For example, at 35 Am. J ur., page 450, Section 8, tht :
Encyclopedia states as follows:
"The relationship [speaking to establishing a
master-servant relationship] may be created bv
express contract but this is not essential; it ma;· I
be created as well by conduct which shows th;t
the parties recognize that one is the employer or
master and that the other is the employee or
servant."
1

The record is replete with evidence to sustain the
theory that there was a contract of employment between
Deseret Architects and the defendant Hockenbury (see
Findings of Fact, R. 116, 117) .

1

I
I

The evidence showed:

I

1. That plaintiff Deseret Architects and Engi·
neers received the benefit of the employee's services.

That Deseret Architects and Engineers super·
vised and directed Hockenbury in his duties.
2.

3. That Terminex, Inc. did not control or super·
vise in any manner his duties when working on the data
survey for Deseret.
4. That the compensation and the method of pa)'"
ment was different when Hockenbury was employed by
Deseret Architects and Engineers.

5. That the duties that the employee was engaged
in differed "extremely" from what he had been doing .
for Terminex when he was collecting data.

IO
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POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID
\OT ERR IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF
THE FACTS IN DETERMINING THAT THE
APPLICANT WAS THE EMPLOYEE OF
THE PLAINTIFF DESERET ARCHITECTS
AND ENGINEERS.
In the Statement of Facts of this brief it appears
clear that the direction given Hockenbury by the plaintiff-employer was more extensive than that set forth in
plaintiff-appellant's brief. On pages.:/_ and .. le-.. of the
Statement of Facts a summary is made of Hockenbury's
cunuection with Deseret Architects.

1

The brief of plaintiffs recognized that there is sub~tantial authority for the proposition that an employee
may be a general servant of a particular employer, howerer, may be a special servant of another if at the time
of the accident in question the special employer was
receiYing the benefit of the employee's work. The defendants agree with plaintiff's proposition that the editors of American Jurisprudence state the prevailing rule
at the citation given by the plaintiff, that is, 58 Am. J ur.,
3!3, page 812. However, plaintiff's brief fails to complete the sentence quoted. Completed it reads as follows:
"**the rule may be stated to be that a general
employer, that is, the employer contracting directly with the employee, is liable for workmen's
compensation in the event of an injury to the
employee unless it is shown by the terms of a
11
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loan hiring or similar arrangement that tlit !
general employer relinquished for the time beina
all primary benefits to and substantial right 1'.
control the work, and if, on the other hand, it 1,
shown b,11 an~ sue~ arrangement that the gener,:!
employer relznquzshes the services and contro/ 11
an employee so that the employee becomes for
the time being sub;ect to the supervision ui!i
another, the latter becomes liable for compcmr:
tion for an injury sustained in the course of surl
work, and the general employer is absolved frvrr,
liability therefor." (Emphasis added)
1

'l'he assertion that Terminex, Inc. was receil'inae
benefits from the contract that Deseret had with tl1t
government (based upon the fact that Deseret reim·
bursed Terminex for an additional 20 % over the amoun'.
actually paid to Hockenbury), is not supported by the
record. The evidence showed that the purpose of sud
payment was an adjustment for other expenditum
such as office expenses and payroll taxes. It is stated
by the plaintiff-appellant that it is "the greatest imposi·
tion on credulity for Nelson to contend that he receirea
such a premium for the mere maintenance of the appl1·
cant's payroll record." This matter was argued exten·
sively in memorandums at the hearing below. There
was no evidence that this was for a profit or a sharinf
in the fruits of Deseret's contract. Certainly, therefore.
the Industrial Commission need not have adopted tlir
theory of the plaintiff that a profit was derived in tlir
survey work flowing to Terminex. In fact, the eYidene
was to the contrary. At R. 72 Mr. Christensen, a part

12
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uer in the firm of Deseret Architects and Engineers,
testified as follows :
"(~. Right. Now, in these prior surveys )fr.
Nelson had an interest in the survey as such?

"A.

That is the way I understand it. Yes.

"Q. In the suney in October of 1966 did he
have any interests as such?

"A.

No."

The evidence is clear that the 20% figure was for
the basis of maintaining the bookkeeping entry that was
necessary in keeping Mr. Hockenbury on Terminex'
payroll. Mr. Christensen testified at R. 70 as follows:
"In this conversation with Mr. Nelson, Mr.
Hockenbury and Mr. Schmidt were made available to us, on the bases that we would take them
at the time they were not needed at Terminex,
that we would reimburse Terminex of Utah their
standard hourly rate, plus 20% for payroll tax
deduction and office overhead, and this type of
expenditures relevant to payroll."

And again, testimony of Mr. Despain, an employee of
Terminex, who stated at R. 46:
" ... but I was given to understand that the
procedure was to bill Deseret Architects and Engineers for the time spent by our men, while they
were working for them, at their normal hourly
rate plus 20% to cover any other additional office
expense and payroll taxes."
The assumption therefore that Terminex was benefilting from the data survey is negated by the testimony

13
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cited above; and, in light of such testimony, it cannot!~:
argued that the Industrial Commission acted arbitrar. J
and capricious in foiling to make the inference thn!
plaintiffs demand.
I

I

A case that is directly in point is Carnes v. Jndu..
trial Commission, 73 Arizona 264, 240 P. 2d 536. TD,.
Industrial Commission denied liability to the corpor3.
tion which was receiving the services of the lent em
ployee at the time of the injmy of the applicant. Hi
Supreme Court reversed the order of the Industnru
Commission.

'1

Carnes sustained fatal injuries from an acciden1
arising out of and in the course of his employment. Fm
about three years prior to the date of the accident he hao
been employed in California by a California corpora·
ti on. A few days prior to the date of the accident tnr
manager of the Arizona corpora ti on phoned the prn1·
dent of the California corporation and asked him to Jena
Carnes for the purpose of doing welding. Prior to tn
time it had been the custom to borrow skilled employw
On all of these occasions the employees would rema~
on the payroll of the California corporation althougt
they would be working for the Arizona corporatio~
The lending employer would charge the other employ<:
for a proportionate share of withholding and social Si'
curity tax together with an amount for bookkeeping. 0:
the date in question Carnes, the employee, was workin:
for the company in Phoenix, Arizona welding when t~
accident occurred. The Supreme Court of Arizona st
1

•
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1

11

forth the annotation in 58 Am. J ur. 812, §343, heretofore quoted, and faced the questions of whether or not
Cnrnes was an employee of the Arizona corporation.
The court examined an applicable statute which defined
regularly employed individuals under their compensation act. (The New Mexico statute in this regard is
similar to the Utah statute.) The court found that he
was within the normal course of the employer's business
and as such would be considered their employee. Respondent in that case made the same argument that
~ appellant is making here in that it was stated that
Carnes was a highly skilled workman and therefore did
G'.
not require supervision in his work by the foreman of
or the Arizona corporation. As such, they urge that the
an Arizona corporation was not the employer because they
ra· did not supervise and control his work. The court
th1 negated this argument and stated as follows:

,

:11·

th:
eti

"If respondent's claims were true, then we ask,
could any highly skilled workman become a special employee, unless by chance his special employer had a sufficient technical knowledge and
skill to direct the employee in the details of his
work? 'Ve believe the correct rule is as stated in
Jones Y. George F. Getty Oil Company, a New
Mexico case, 10 Cir., 92 F. 2d 255 at page 259:
'The controlling factor is: For whom is the work
being performed, and who had the power to control the work and the employee? The authority
to determine the work to be done, and the manner
in which it is to be carried on, necessarily includ~s
the right to suspend or terminate the work altogether or, possibly, to exclude the particular

15
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emp.loyee from the job, not including the rigl
to discharge the employee from the service of k
general employer, * * it:· nor need it include IL
actual giving of directions to the employee,
connection with the work he is doing'."
•

The court also considered the fact that Carnes w~
not on the payroll of the Arizona corporation but ratk
on the Califcr11ia corporation's payroll. The court he!1/
that th;s fact was not persuasive and stated:
I

I

" 'The principle is thoroughly well establisn~:1
at common law that an employee of one maslf!
who is loaned to another master, and who assendl
to the change of masters, becomes the servant, for
the time being, of him to whom he is lent, and tllli
principle has full application to the master ani
servant relation under the Compensation Act."
Another point raised in this case is the fact that tfi,
Arizona corporation did not pay premiums on the em·
ployee Carnes and the California corporation had been
making premiums. This is the same argument made~:
the plaintiff in this case. The court held that this la:
is not persuasive in determining the question of Iiabilit·
for compensation. It appears, therefore, that the pr
mary test to be used in determining who is liable fr:
compensation is who received the benefit for the wori
and services performed at the time of the accident. Sr
Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Company, 92 F. 2d zj;
Also see Bamberger Electric Railroad Company v. ft·
dustrial Commission, 59 Utah 257, 203 Pac. 3.J.5. ,j

The cases cited by the respondent are, we resper ·
fully submit, not in point. None of the cases cancer
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the situation of a "lent employee." For example, in

Heany v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, 20 Atl. 2d 592 the com-

pany entered into an agreement with a third person for
the lease of a tractor owned by this person. Part of the
agreement was that the person who owned the tractor
would furnish all labor. Pursuant to this agreement the
applicant was hired by the owner of the truck and performed services for him.

In Creech v. Sirkin, 88 S.E. 2d 697, the owner of
U1e property contracted with an independent contractor
for services to be rendered. An employee of the independent contractor was injured. The court held that
the employee did not have a right of compensation
against the owner.

1

The fundamental rule in cases of this kind is found
ilia Supreme Court case of Denton v. Yazoo~ M.V.R.
Co., et al., 52 S. Ct. 141, 284 U.S. 305, where the court
held as fallows:

I

"YVhether the railroad companies may be held
liable for Hunter's act depends not upon the fact
that he was their servant generally, but upon
whether the work which he was doing at the time
was their work or that of another; a question
determined, usually at least, by ascertaining
under whose authority and command the work
was being done. \Vhen one person puts his serYant at the disposal and under the control of
another for the performance of a particular serrice for the latter, the servant, in respect of his
acts in that service, is to be dealt with as the
serrnnt of the latter and not of the former. This
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rule is element~1y and finds support in a larii:
number of dec1s1ons, a few only of which neri
b~ cited."
·1
Plamtiff concludes its brief by stating that theer,I
of the Industrial Commission decision is that it adoi:,i
a concept that a homeowner who contracts for servi~:
and gives direction to personnel sent to perform t~;
services be~omes an employer subject to the liabilitir
of the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act. The effecto
this decision is not to extend workmen's compensatio~
to this type of situation. In order for the special employer to be held liable, he must be one subject to tl i
YV orkmen' s Compensation Act as defined by statute
Certainly the homeowner as set forth by plaintiff ink
example would not fall into this category. See Ocea:

Accident and Guaranty Corporation v. Peter Pou/sea
244 'Vis. 286, 12 N.W. 2d 129, 152 ALR 810.

From the foregoing it appears clear that at If:;
time of the accident Mr. Hockenbury was performini
a service for the plaintiffs; that there was sufficient eic·
dence to sustain the Industrial Commission's order. T~
plaintiff makes a point that there was no negotiatio~
with the claimant in reference to his new employmen:
or wages and as such he cannot be considered a specW
employee of Deseret.
An interesting case regarding this general problem

1

1

1

t

u

is Murray v. Wasatch Grading Company, 73 Utah4iti

27 4 Pac. 940. In this case the issue presented was wilt·

ti defen1I·
ther or not the plaintiff was the employee of 1e
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11

ant Wasatch Grading Company or the Denver and Rio
Grande \Vestern Railroad Company. Defendant was a
eonstructiou company engaged in the construction of a
state ruad in Utah County. The contract with the state
provided that the D. & R.G. Railroad Company would
' provide to the contractor "competent railroad employees
as may be necessary for the proper protection of the railroad property for traveling public." Because of a blasting operation it became necessary for 'Vasatch Grading
Company to be advised in advance of the arrival of
trains so that the track could be clear to permit the free
and uninterrupted passage of such trains. Before
plaintiff began his employment at the construction site
c he had been employed by the Denver and Rio Grande
!: Western Railroad Company. A superintendent of D.
n ~ R. G. brought the plaintiff to the construction site
and informed him of his wages and the hours that
would be required in performing his new duties. While
ni not engaged in communicating with the train dispatcher
r. it was required of the plaintiff to assist the defendant's
'~ employees in removing rock and debris from the railio: road track. The defendant \V asatch Grading Com10: pany carried compensation with the State Insurance
:i~ Fund, however, did not list the plaintiff as one of its
employees at the time of the injury. The plaintiff was
injured when assisting the employees of the defendant
lee ·
Ill remoYing from the railroad tracks some rocks that
1111 l
uad been thrown upon the track. The agreement be;ut· tween the defendant and D. & R. G. was that the rail~011
road company would maintain the plaintiff on its
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payroll and that the defendant would reimburst
railroad company for the money paid to the plaim
by D. & R. G. The court held that in determining[
question of who was an employee one referred tu,
law of master and senant. The plaintiff, when injur·
was working under a contract of hire and was enga;
in the usual course and business and occupation of i
construeti<Pl company. The court held that under t[1,
circumstances that the employee while working~•
benefiting the construction company in keeping
railroad track clear, was to be considered an empk
of said company and therefore his exclusive reim
was against it for compensation under the '¥orkmc
Compensation Act.
Certainly in this particular case there were no lit~
tiations between the employee and the special emplni
but, nevertheless, a contract of employment was fo
and the determination made that he was an emplrn·
of the construction company.
1

CONCLUSION

.

. 'i

The evidence sustains the Industnal Comm1ssJ11 i
order in this matter that at the time of the accidenllI
question the defendant Murrel Hockenbury, Jr., wa 1-i
employee of Deseret Architects and Engineers and it[
his insurance carrier, the Northwestern National L!
Insurance Company, is liable for all compensation. '
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE
Attorney for Defendants-Respondei
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